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A COMMENT ON FISHERIES AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN 
G. W. Kitson, 
Agricultural Economics Research Unit, 
LINCOLN COLLEGE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of this paper is to assess the validity 
of New Zealand's negotiating strategie s with Japan over the question 
of improved access for New Zealand's agricultural, forestry and fish 
products in the Japanese market in return for continued access to 
fish in New Zealand's economic management zones by Japan. This 
assessment should be regarded as preliminary in so far as it is based 
only on a subjective evaluation of the facts which surround the issue. 
These facts were gathered largely as a result of a visit to Japan in 
November and December 1977, during which discussions were held 
with fishing companies, fishing industry organisations, officials 
representing both New Zealand and Japanese interests, and researchers. 
In addition a good deal of documentary information wa$ gathered from 
various sources in Japan. It is probable that further evaluation of 
this will be made subsequently with the objective both of providing 
New Zealand negotiators with a more detailed and objective data base 
for their negotiations than is currently available and to provide New 
Zealand commercial fishing and trading organisations with information 
of use in developing their marketing plans and in assessing the 
validity of these marketing plans. 
Because the New Zealand approach has been to link fishing 
relationships with agricultural, especially livestock product, 
relationships, through the format of its negotiations with Japan, 
it is necessary to discuss not only Japanese fisheries policies and 
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sensitivities but also the inter-relationships of these to livestock 
policies and the Japanese food economy. For this reason discussions 
in Japan were extended to food and agricultural economis ts and 
officials and information gathered from these sources. 
2. 
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2. BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS 
New Zealand, in linking the question of access of livestock 
and forestry products to the Japanese market to Japanese fishing 
rights in New Zealand's 200 mile economic management zone, has 
acted in an unprecedented way. The reasons for this action are 
several but they principally indicate a long history of negotiation 
with Japan for improved access to that market for New Zealand 
livestock products. Many attempts have been made to evolve formulae 
by which Japanese livestock producers would not be handicapped by 
greater market access for New Zealand products, dairy products 
in particular. In addition to market access difficulties in Japan, 
New Zealand, along with other agricultural producing countries, 
has seen over recent years an emergence of more protective 
agricultural policies in other markets also. These have been 
coincident with domestic economic problems for which the solution 
is to improve export receipts, by economic restructuring towards 
the export sector. As this cannot be achieved quickly, other short 
term solutions have been actively sought. One of these is improved 
market access for agricultural products. Thus for New Zealand, 
negotiations have been initiated in the form that they have, partly 
out of frustration throp.gh lack of success of previous more moderate 
approaches, and partly out of desperation as a result of current 
and future balance of payment difficulties. 
Specific problems New Zealand faces in its economic 
relationship with Japan relate especially to non tariff barriers 
for Japanese imports of dairy products, beef, some fish, apples 
and sawn timber. They relate also to the methods used to administer 
many of these controls. For example the six monthly rather than 
annual announcements of beef import quotas allow little time for a 
beef industry to adjust to new market situations. Similarly the 
short notice given between announcement and fuliilment dates of 
beef tenders penalises countries like New Zealand whose shipping 
service's may not be as regular as those from countrie s like 
Australia or the United States. 
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Beef, in addition to being subject to import quota is, like 
butter, condensed milk and commercial milk powder, imported largely 
by the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC). As such 
these items are known as State Traded items. The objective of the 
State Trading system recognised under Article XVII of the GATT is 
"to stabilise" prices. In Japan's case however these are stabilised 
at substantially above World prices, the domestic wholesale price 
being several times average C. 1. F. prices. Thus the State Trading 
system is "protective" in its impact on trade. 
The administration of quarantine and industrial code 
regulations by Japan has also drawn comment from New Zealand 
with respect to apples and to sawn timber. For apples the problem 
is the presence of codling moth in New Zealand. Despite New Zealand 
assurances of absence of codling n10th from commercial shipments 
Japan has demandea complete fumigation before entry is permitted. 
Recent acceptance by Japan of American cherry imports which had 
previously been excluded because of codling moth followed a long and 
enormously expensive period of testing and treatrrlent of American 
cherries. Furthermore the periods within which cherries are 
allowed entry are restricted for the protection of Japanese producers. 
For New Zealand sawn timber the problem is that, according 
to Japanese industrial codes, annual growth rings of radiata pine 
are not sufficiently dense and the timber is therefore designated as 
being of insuffic ient strength. New Zealand on the other hand says 
that more scientific testing indicates that sawn pinus radiata is 
sufficiently strong for construction purposes and that any apparent 
inadequacies of annual growth dng density are compensated by 
fibre length. 
" 
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For fish the principal concern by New Zealand relates to 
import quotas for squid and the ten per cent duty imposed on squid 
imports'. New Zealand fishermen find it particularly irritating that 
squid taken from New Zealand waters by Japanese fishermen do not 
face the same re strictions. Appendix I provides a summary of 
agricultural and marine products remaining under import quota 
restrictions and Appendix II details marine product quotas by species. 
From the Japanese point of view the background to the current 
negotiations is somewhat different. Recent years have seen a 
substantial fall in Japan's self sufficiency in food production. The 
officially stated figure is that Japan is about seventy per cent self 
sufficient in food production. But a more realistic figure is nearer 
forty per cent. This is so because self sufficiency calculations are 
based on food balance sheets showing physical volumes of food used 
and wholesale prices which were operative in 1965. Using 1970 
prices instead reduces self sufficiency considerably. Furthermore 
if self sufficiencies are calculated on a food value (i. e. calories) 
basis rather than a money value basis, they are reduced to less 
than forty per cent. The desire to produce an official self sufficiency 
statistic which is as high as possible to the extent that it is misleading 
is significant because it is indicative of the great sensitivity at the 
official level, of Japan's capacity to feed itself. While public statement 
indicates that Japan is remarkably capable of feeding itself, officials 
are concerned, both because of this falling capability and because the 
publicly stated view is far from realistic and real self sufficiency in 
food production is only about forty per cent. Greater reliance on 
imported foodstuffs is therefore unpalatable and was made even more 
so when President Nixon in 1973 placed an embargo on the export of 
soya beans of which Japan consumes over four million tons per annum, 
about 90 per cent corning from the United States. This single act, 
through 'its impact on public opinion, gave new impetus to those in Japan 
who advocated higher levels of food self sufficiency for strategic reasons. 
Oil supply problelYls and public awarenes s of Japan's reliance on 
ilYlported raw lYlaterials have heightened Japan's desire to produce 
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as lYluch dOlYlestically as possible. While the production of higher 
levels of livestock products dOlYlestically ensures a higher level of 
self sufficiency when this is lYleasured in lYloney terlYls, it has little 
relevance to the philosophy that Japan needs to be more self sufficient 
for strategic reasons as higher levels of livestock product production 
lYlerely ilYlply greater ilYlports of anilYlal feedstuffs. For this reason 
a good deal of pressure exists frolYl SOlYle sections in Japan for a 
better balance between self sufficiency in anilYlal feedstuffs production 
and livestock products production. This would ilYlply greater land 
use for feedstuffs and possibly, but not necessarily, lower levels of 
livestock product production. This lYlay in turn be translated into 
greater delYland for ilYlported livestock products. 
in this regard are the iollowing:-
Critical factors 
(a) The precise land use relationship between feedstuff 
production and live stock product production in Japan. 
The depressing effect on livestock product production 
of greater anilYlal feedstuff production would be lYluch 
greater for the beef and dairy sectors than for pork and 
chicken production. 
(b) The degree to which consulYlption of livestock products 
lYlay be depressed by administratively retained high prices. 
Indications are that the depressing effect of prices on 
consumption is very high with recent price elasticities 
calculated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
being greater than one. 
New Zealand, in its negotiations with Japan, is 
particularly concerned that the Japanese dairy market 
will eventually emulate that of the EEC where consumption 
is constrained by high prices with domestic producers being 
highly protected and subsidised. 
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Added to the philosophical view of Japan's reluctance to 
increase imports of foodstuffs substantially are domestic politico-
economic factor s. The enormous political power of the rural 
sector and its influence through organisations like NOKYO 
(Federation of Rural Co-operatives) and special dietmen' s lobbies 
on the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is one of these. Another 
is the back-to-the-wall fight by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry (MAF) against its seemingly inevitable fall from being one 
of the pre-eminent government ministries to one of lesser importance 
as the role of agriculture in the economy declines relatively. This 
resistance is manifest in the Ministry's determination to promote 
domestic agriculture and to retain its share of the domestic budget. 
It is against this general background that New Zealand has 
requested that Japan adopt a more liberal stance towards imports 
and to the way in which the import machinery is administered. For 
the first time in dealing with Japan on these matters New Zealand has 
found itself with a bargaining tool - Japanese access to New Zealand 
fishing grounds. The question which remains is whether or not this 
tool should have been used at all and if the answer is yes, w.hether 
it has been used wisely. 
New Zealand's tactic of making demands from the Japanese 
has been criticised on a number of grounds. One of these is a 
philosophical one that the use of demands with Japan has never 
been successful. This criticism has its roots in the Japanese 
system of decision making and inter-personal relationships. Here 
harmonious compromise is the principal consideration and in 
reaching this compromise time is unimportant. This is very well 
illustrated by the Japanese legal system. The number of civil 
proceedings in Japan is very few and those cases which do come 
before the courts frequently drag on for years as the opposing parties 
gravitate towards a compromise. 
The applicability of this form of resolution of disputes to 
international issues however is questionable. An analysis of 
Japanese reaction when international issues have arisen', tends to 
support'the view that in international matters Japanese are much 
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more pragmatic and that while the Japanese system of resolving issues 
by compromise may be applicable to domestic situations it is not so 
appropriate in the area of international issues. To illustrate this 
point Japan's trade surplus problems with the United States in 1972 
were resolved in part by Japan agreeing, under duress, to 
"emergency imports" of $1000 million from the United States. 
This was largely of agricultural comlTIodities. Japanese pragmatism 
was again illustrated in 1973 when oil exports from the Middle East 
were suspended. Japan very quickly recognised the legitimacy of 
Arab rights in Palestine and just as quickly despatched envoys to 
Saudi Arabia and Iran offering technical aid involving very large sums. 
More recent examples have been threats of import restrictions being 
placed on Japanese bearings and other commodities in the EEC and on 
a range of items in the United States. Both have brought concessions 
from Japan. Reactions against Japanese "economic imperialism" 
in South East As ia in 1974 were quickly followed by substant,ial 
increases in economic aid to those countries. 
Consequently historical precedent does not support the 
view that Japan will not concede when placed under duress. It 
probably is true however that concessions .made will be the absolute 
minimum that will satisfy the other party and are frequently not as 
great in the small print as at first appeared. Recent negotiations with 
the United States where concessions have been added in small amounts 
illustrates the first point while the expansion of the beef import quota 
in 1976 to satisfy Australian demands illustrates the second as some 
of the expansion of the beef import quota was not strictly an expansion 
at all, being classified as "special" imports. 
This discus sion does not neces sarily indicate that Japan 
has not made trade concessions when not under duress. It would not 
be true to say so. It would probably be true to say however that 
these concessions were not of such great significance to Japan. Nor 
does this discussion necessarily justify New Zealand's current 
negotiating demands for there is no known precedent of Japan making 
concessions to countries as small as New Zealand. Nor is there a 
great deal of evidence of significant concessions being made on 
livestock products. In the final analysis the success of New Zealand's 
negotiations with Japan will probably depend largely on the following 
three factors: 
(1) The real impact on Japan of exclusion of Japanese 
fishing activities from New Zealand waters. This impact 
may be in two areas. The first is the impact on Japanese 
food supply and the second t~e impact on the fishing industry. 
(2) Implications of concessions being given to New Zealand 
on Japan's relationships with other coun tries. 
(3) Political realities in Japan especially the power of the 
fishing lobby compared with that of the agricultural, and 
more particularly,the live stock lobby and the extent to which 
Japan may desire changes in the agricultural sector in any 
case. 
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3. IMPACT OF JAPAN1S EXCLUSION FROM NEW ZEALAND1S 
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT ZONES 
In broad terms Japanese dependence on fish caught in 
New Zealand1s 200 mile economic management zones is minimal, 
at only about 1.0 per cent of total fish production. In more specific 
terms Japan1s reliance on squid caught in New Zealand waters is 
greater, being calculated at 3.9 per cent. Furthermore, Japan1s 
potential reliance on New Zealand is rather more significant than 
the 1.0 per cent indicated. Of particular significance in this 
regard is the progressive exclusion of Japan from North Pacific 
fishing grounds within the 200 mile economic zones of Russia 
and the United States. 
these areas to Japan. 
Table One illustrates the significance of 
This table indicates that in 1975 nearly 27 per cent of 
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Japanl s total fish catch was from the economic zones of the United 
States and the Soviet Union and 0.7 per cent from New Zealand waters. 
One Japanese fishing industry official predicted that the 
volume of fish being caught in Russian and American waters would 
be reduced to negligible amounts in the next 10-15 years. The 
implications of a reduction of these proportions is obvibUS. 
Table One also indicates that the volume of fish caught by 
Japan in New Zealand waters in 1975 was 80,000 tons. For 1976 
it was about 120,000 tons. These figures are at variance with that 
of the Japan Fisheries Association which has been quoted at 
160,000 tons for 1976. The Fisheries Agency also quotes 'the catch 
for the Southern section of the Pacific Ocean at only 86,000 tons in 
1974 while the Japan Fisheries Association and F AO quote 350,000 
tons (1976) and 71, 000 tons (1975 ) respectively for areas defined as 
the South Pacific and the South West Pacific. Obviously some 
disagreement exists over quanti ties of fish taken from New Zealand 
TABLE ONE 
Japanese Fish Catches and the World I s 200 Mile Economic Zones 
Total Japanese Catches 
Total Catches in Economic Zones 
of Other Countries 
Catches in Economic Zones of 
the following Countries: 
U.S.A. 
Canada 
U.S.S.R. 
China 
Korea 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Other Countries 
1974 
10,808 
4,526 
1,585 
26 
1,630 
180 
209 
18 
78 
530 
Units: Thousand Tons 
1975 
10,545 
3,744 
1,410 
21 
1,396 
152 
241 
12 
80 
432 
12. 
Source: Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Japan. 
and surrounding waters by Japanese fishermen. This is explainable 
in part by increased catches between 1975 and 1976. The estimate 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (N. Z. ) is that the 1976 
catch of all species within New Zealand IS 200 mile economic zone was 
about 300, 000 tonnes with the New Zealand fish catch being about 
60, 000 tonnes. 
Statistics for squid catches in New Zealand and South Pacific 
waters show a greater measure of agreement with Fisheries Agency 
statistics indicating a catch of 19, 000 tonnes for the Southern portion 
of the Pacific Ocean in 1974 and 23, 000 tonnes in New Zealand's 200 
mile economic zone in 1975. 
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Total consumption of squid in Japan in 1975 was 589,000 tonnes. 
This was constituted in the following way: 
TABLE TWO 
Japanese Squid Supply 1975 
Imports 
Japanese Catches: 
(a) In 200 Economic Zones of Other Countries 
(b) In Japanese Waters 
(c) Total 
Total Consumption 
58,580 
227,000 
304,000 
531,000 
589,000 
Source: Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry, Japan. 
This table shows that in 1975 9.9 per cent of Japanese squid 
was imported and a further 38.5 per cent was caught by Japanese 
vessels inside the 200 mile economic zones of other countries. 
The latter volume was constituted in the following way: 
TABLE THREE 
Japanese Squid Catches in 
Other Countries I Economic Zones 1975 
U.S.S.R. 108,000 
Korea 61,000 
New Zealand 23,000 
U.S.A. 19,000 
China 16,000 
Total 227,000 
Source: Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, Japan. 
By far the most important economic zone for Japanese 
squid supply is therefore the Soviet Union with New Zealand waters, 
supplying 10.1 per cent of Japanese squid caught in foreign waters, 
ranking third. It is notable that Russian quotas for Japanese squid 
catches in Russian economic zones in 1976 were 132, 000 tons. 
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In 1975 the Republic of Korea supplied 33 per cent of Japanese 
uquid imports, Thailand 15 per cent and Spain 14 per cent. Other 
significant suppliers were Ireland, Taiwan, Yemen, Greece, Senegal 
and Morocco. In 1975 and 1976 New Zealand was not a significant 
supplier of imported squid to Japan but in the eight months till 
August 1977 New Zealand supplied 0.75 per cent (332 tonnes) of 
Japan's imported squid. Japan's total squid imports have grown 
quite rapidly from 29, 000 tonnes in 1973 to more than 68, 000 tonnes 
in 1976. 
Trends in catches by Japanese trawlers in New Zealand waters 
for other species are shown in Table Four. 
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TABLE FOUR 
Japanese Trawler Catches in N. Z. Waters by Species 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Red Cod 2,140 2,082 2,748 2,950 2,131 
Hoki 411 1,636 4,758 2,069 4,748 
Gurnard 463 169 94 89 146 
Bata 108 89 62 141 149 
~napper 522 1,444 616 472 922 
pther Snapper 1,595 446 42 12 161 
Tarakihi 470 1,097 670 1,481 1,500 
!Kingfish 19 1 71 581 568 2,180 
!Warehou 250 2,221 4,466 2,342 9,085 
lHorse Mackerel 13,301 18,070 14,963 17,738 13,486 
Barracouta 14,421 17,118 9,983 18,219 10,860 
lMackerel 17 11 11 41 3 
Trevally 866 161 210 684 3,914 
~hark 448 447 984 414 879 
Others 7,736 3,237 1,373 2,011 1,957 
~quid 1 729 4,041 3,045 3,469 
Total 42,214 49,135 45,601 52,276 55,590 
Source: Japan Fisheries Association. 
When squid angling and tuna long lining are added to the 
55,000 tons trawl catch in this table it would be close to the official 
Fisheries Agency figure of 80,000 tons. The trawl catch for 1976 
quoted by the Fisheries Agency for 1976 was 100,500 tons. 
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By species, horse or jack mackerel (aji in Japanese) and 
barracouta are by far the most important species caught by Japanese 
trawlers in New Zealand waters. In 1975 they accounted for nearly 
44 per cent of all fish caught in New Zealand waters by Japanese 
trawlers. Reference to Table Five, a species by species assessment 
of marketability of New Zealand fish in Japan indicates that both are 
marketable in Japan but that horse or jack mackerel is subject to 
quota restriction as is southern or silver kingfish (ginsawara in 
Japanese). The latter is significant for the rapid increase in the 
rate of catching by Japanese vessels in New Zealand waters with 
catches going from 19 tons in 1971 to over 2,000 tons in 1975. Other 
species whose catches have increased rapidly are tarakihi (470 tons 
to 1,500 tons), warehou (250 tons to 9,085 tons), hoki (411 tons to 
4,748 tons) and trevally (866 tons to 3,914 tons), Reference to 
Table Five shows the latter three species especially, warehou, hoki 
and trevally, as having good luarket prospects in Japan. Tarakihi 
on the other hand is described as having little marketability. 
Reference again to Table Five shows that market prospects 
for tuna species are particularly good and that possibilities for snapper, 
hake, hoki and trevally are comparatively large. 
already well established on the Japanese market. 
Snapper of course is 
The other three 
species are less well known. TrevaHy in particular appears to have 
good prospects on the Japanese market, having been accepted by some 
sectors of the market as being suitable for sashimi (raw fish). Others 
however suggest that fat levels are too low for sashimi. Hake, or 
meruluza as it is known in Japanese, has been described by the Japanese 
industry as being tasty and easy to use with increasing demand. A deep water 
species, it is regarded as being highly under-utilised in the Southern Hemisphere. 
Fish Species 
Southern Tuna 
Yellowfin Tuna 
Albacore 
Southern 
Kingfish 
Skipjack 
Marlin 
Sardine 
Sharks 
Elephant Fish 
Barracouta 
Horse :mackerel) 
Jack :mackerel ) 
Warehou ) 
Silver fish) 
Aust. sal:mon 
NZ snapper 
Tarakihi 
Ling 
Sea perch 
Groper 
Flounder 
Red Cod 
NZ Hake 
Hoki 
Trevally 
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TABLE FIVE 
Suitability of New Zealand Fish Species for Japanese M.arket 
Meat Characteristics Uses 
Red :mea t, fat :mea t Sas hi:m i':' 
Light red :meat, Sashi:mi 
fat :meat 
" 
" 
Red:meat, fat :meat 
Pink :meat, fat :meat 
Red :meat, fat :meat 
White :meat, spoils 
easily 
" 
Red :meat, fir:m 
Whi te :meat, light 
White :meat, soft, fat 
White :meat, light 
" 
11 
" " 
White, fir:m 
White, bony 
White, fir:m 
White, soft 
White, soft 
White, soft 
White, fir:m 
White, fat 
Sashi:mi 
Sas hi:mi,p:oc ess ing 
Cooking 
Processing,fish 
:meal 
Raw :material 
for Suri:mi ':' 
Cooking, 
processing 
" 
11 
" 
11 
Sashi:mi, cooking 
Cooking 
Sashi:mi, cooking 
Cooking; 
processing 
Cooking, 
processing 
Cooking, 
processing 
Cooking 
Cooking, 
processing 
Processing 
Cooking, 
processing 
Cooking, 
processing 
Sashi:mi, cooking 
Marketability 
Large :market if quality good 
" 
" 
I:mport quota ite:m - co:mpetit-
ion fro:m Korea 
Most exported to USA. 
Sufficient supplies j.n Japan 
Sufficient supplies in Japan 
Litt Ie :marketability 
Marketable 
Marketable but i:mport 
quota ite:m 
Marketable 
Very little :market possibility 
Co:mparatively large possibility 
Little :marketability 
Little :marketability 
Little :marketability 
Little :marketability 
Little :marketability 
Little :marketability 
Co:mparatively large possibility 
Co:mparatively large possibility 
Co:mparatively large possibility 
Source: Nippon Suisan KK. 
Note: Sashi:mi - a raw fish dish and occupies a top slot in the :market. 
Suri:mi - fish paste. 
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Little is known of the extent of this resource in New Zealand waters. 
This species has an important place in Japanese strategies to 
counter 200 mile economic zones extensions around the world. 
Species described as being marketable in Japan include barracouta, 
horse mackerel and the warehou silver fish bracket. Of these, most 
interest was held in Japan in warehou which is regarded as of 
sufficiently high quality for sashimi. On the other hand some 
companies say they have experienced difficulty in selling warehou. 
In summary it is notable that of the five species whose 
catches by Japanese vessels in New Zealand waters have increased 
rapidly (hoki, tarakihi, kingfish, warehou and trevally) four (all except 
tarakihi) have been de scribed either as having comparatively large 
market possibilities or as being marketable. These four species 
accounted for 35.8 per cent of fish caught in New Zealand waters 
by Japanese trawlers in 1975 as against only 3.7 per cent in 1971. 
More detailed discussion of marketability, uses, import levels 
and impact of 200 mile economic zone extensions, will probably 
be presented in a subsequent report. 
4. THE DIETARY IMPORTANCE OF FISH IN JAPAN 
Of total protein consumption in Japan about 44 per cent 
comes from animal sources. This is composed of about half 
from fish, shellfish and whales, with the other half coming from 
Ii vestock principally in the form of meat, milk and eggs. As of 
1975/76 about 40 per cent of Japan's annual fish catch of around 
10 million tonnes was caught within the 200 mile economic zones 
of other countries, with 27 per cent coming from the economic 
zones of Rus sia and the United States. Consequently, exclusion 
of Japanese vessels from the World's 200 mile economic zones 
would give a potential reduction of just on 10 per cent in Japan's 
protein supply. Exclusion from Russian and American economic 
zones alone would mean a potential reduction in protein supply of 
just on.6 per cent. Exclusion from New Zealand waters would 
re suit in a potential reduction of about 0.2 per cent. 
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5. CONSIDERATIONS FOR JAPANESE FOOD POLICY MAKERS 
While a pos sible 10 per cent reduction in protein supply 
must result in considerable concern to food policy makers in Japan, 
their concern must be tempered hy a number of factors. The 
important ones seem to be the following: 
(a) The degree to which the loss of protein can be compensated 
by counter strategies which will result in more fish protein from 
other sources or a higher protein extraction rate. Obvious 
strategies here are fish farming and more economical use of 
existing fish resources. 
(b) The degree to which other forms of animal protein can 
substitute for fish protein. This has obvious implications for 
the Japanese livestock industry and livestock products trade. 
(c) The degree to which catch losses can be compensated 
by greater imports. Given the sensitivity of Japanese food 
policy makers to food self-sufficiency levels and the potential 
. 
impact on the Japanese fishing and related industries, this is 
obviously not a'policy which would have great appeal. 
(d) The final extent of and the rate of exclusion from 200 mile 
economic zones of other countries. On this point a great deal 
of confusion appears to exist in Japan. Although the Japanese 
catch reduction in Rus s ian and American water s were 35 per cent 
and 11 per cent respectively, for the 1977 quota year, many 
Japanese observers consider that further reduction in catch 
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quotas from these critical areas will be minimal. Other s however 
suggest that Japan will be excluded completely from all the World t s 
200 mile economic zones within 10-15 years. The principal 
observation to be made from this is that the Japanese practice of 
"wait and see" is almost certain to be adopted and that, even in 
the worst situation envisaged, total exclusion from the World t s 
200 mile economic zones within 10-15 year s, Japan can afford 
to wait for some considerable time before action is required. 
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In addition to the above factors however, Japanese food 
policy makers are sensitive to the fact that some important and 
embarrassing distortion in fish supply by species is likely to occur 
under the new order in access to the World's fishing grounds. Of 
principal significance here is the reduction in supply of Alaska pollack 
through quotas imposed by the Russian and American governments 
on fish taken from the waters of those countries. About 2. 5 million 
tons of pollack were taken by Japanese vessels from economic zones 
of the United States and Russia before quotas were applied. This is 
nearly 25 per cent of all fish consumed in Japan. The bulk of this 
was processed into kamaboko. This was out of a total of 3.4 million 
tons of all species taken from the waters of these countries in 1976. 
With quotas for P?llack from U. S. waters reduced by nearly 20 per cent 
in 1977 and with ever greater reductions in Russian pollack quotas, 
the impact on the pollack catching and processing industry had been 
cons iderable. Furthermore those reductions have had strong regional 
effects with Hokkaido and North Eastern Honshu sectors of the industry 
being particularly affected, especially small sized operations which 
dominate Japanese fishing activities in the Northern Pacific. 
Of more particular interest to New Zealand are distortions 
that are likely to occur in the squid industry. With the imposition of 
the Russian exclusive economic zone New Zealand is likely to become 
the second most important source of squid for Japan outside of Korea. 
New Zealand's significance is enhanced also by the declining catches 
from the Sea of Japan and the fact that New Zealand provides the only 
significant waters in the Southern Hemisphere in which the highly 
specialised Japanese squid angling vessels can operate in their 
o£f- season. Again the impact on the squid industry of exclusive 
economic management zones is concentrated on Hokkaido and on 
relatively small companies. Most of the 130 boats operating in 
New Zealand waters for example belong to the Japan Large Size 
Squid Angling As sociation and are largely separate operations, the 
largest companies having only four or five vessels. It is estimated 
that the squid industry in total employs over 100,000 fishermen. 
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Another species distortion with implications for New Zealand 
concerns tuna and the tuna fishing industry based in Shikoku. It 
appears that exclusion from New Zealand's 200 mile economic zones 
would deprive these fishermen not only of fish in the New Zealand 
area but would prevent them catching these fish in areas beyond New 
Zealand on the tuna annual migration path. 
A further point of which Japanese food policy makers are 
aware is that current food consumption levels in Japan are still 
moderate by standards of developed western countries and that 
continued growth in incomes in Japan will see a growth in demand 
for animal protein in particular. With consumer preferences for 
higher quality fish being strong, supply limitations for these species 
will have very strong price effects. This would in turn make the 
improvement of nutritional standards a more difficult task •. 

6. COUNTER STRATEGIES TO 200 MILE ECONOMIC ZONES 
Discussions with Japanese fishing industry spokesmen and 
officials revealed that an official comprehens ive policy to counter 
world-wide imposition of 200 mile economic zones does not exist. 
However many suggestions were made in discussions as to activities 
which may alleviate losses of fishing grounds. These could be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) Policies by which as much as possible of fishing grounds 
developed by Japan now within economic zones of other countries 
are retained. This applies especially to the North Pacific where 
Japan developed as fishing grounds before World War II. 
Japanese are particularly sensitive to losses of Alaska pollack 
which were regarded by other nations as "trash from the sea". 
They feel that because they developed both the fishing skills 
and the market for this unwanted resource, they should have 
some priorities over continuing access to it. 
Policies aimed at maximum retention of access to 
traditionally used fishing grounds would include joint venture 
development and co-operation policies such as fishing research 
which would leave most countries well disposed towards Japan 
when fishing quotas for foreign countries are allocated. 
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(b) Development of new fishing grourids. This refer s particularly 
to Southern Hemisphere fishing grounds and deep water fishing 
activities for species such as hake (meruluza). Areas of interest 
here are waters around New Zealand, off Patagonia and 
Madagascar. Although the extent of the resource in these areas 
is uncertain, Japanese observers believe that the Southern 
Hemisphere waters have better prospects than tropical waters 
because unlike tropical areas where water temperatures are 
fairly constant at different depths, temperate waters have a 
significant temperature gradient which ensures water circulation 
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and therefore movement of plankton and other fish feed. 
Political instability in countries like Argentina and Southern 
African countries, enhances the attractiveness of new fishing 
ground development in New Zealand waters. 
(c) Reference has been made already to the contra policy 
of greater fish imports into Japan. Because of food self 
sufficiency impacts and effects on the Japanese domestic 
industry, this is likely to be a second rank policy option. 
Nevertheless Japanese fish imports since about 1971 have been 
increasing rapidly. This has been mainly in the form of higher 
value species of shrimps, crabs, and herring and salmon roe. 
Consequently although volumes have not been great, values have, 
so that in value terms Japan's fish imports are greater than 
her exports. Japan is now second in the World only to the 
United States as an importer of fish. Furthermore Japanese 
fish imports are now changing to include cheaper species such 
as mackerel and sardines.· While this trend is expected to 
continue, transportation costs present a problem for a basically 
low value species. 
(d) New Resource development outside the World's 200 mile 
economic zones: Fisheries activities of this nature also involve 
hake but possibly even more significant are the krill resources 
in Antarctic waters. The Food and Agricultural Organisation 
of the United Nations has estimated that the world's fisheries 
can have a maximum sustainable yield of about 120 million tons 
by 1980. This includes 50 million tons of krill. It is also 
estimated that annual yields of about 4 million tons of deep sea 
fish are available throughout the world. 
Problems do however exist in the development of these 
resources. For example transportation and freezing costs for 
krill have been found to be very high, and for deep water fish 
catching costs are high. Catching lines for example need to 
be very long with a fishing depth of 1500 metres, requiring 
3000. metres of line. 
In addition to these problems, use of these resources, 
krill in particular, requires a change in conswnption patterns 
which may involve heavy promotional costs. .An alternative 
for krill may of course be its use as a livestock feedstuff, 
releasing anchovy currently caught in the Sea of Japan for 
human conswnption, possibly as kamaboko. 
(e) Fish farming development has been referred to previously. 
This involves principally valuable species such as eel, yellowtail 
and prawn. F. A. O. estimate that 10-20 tons per annum of 
farmed fish can be raised from one square kilometre. In Japan 
yields are currently closer to the upper level. Extrapolation 
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of this over the estimated 120,000 square kilometres still available 
for this purpose in Japan would give a potential production of 
1.2 million to 2.4 million tons, about 2-3 times current production 
levels. 
Development of fish farming is however not a simple proces s 
and with poor input output ratios ensuring high costs. For example 
the current technique of raising yellowtail from a feedstuff based on 
sardine means that eight kilograms of the latter are required to 
produce one kg of yellowtail. Consequently the hunt is now on 
for substitutes for sardine which could therefore be used for hwnan 
conswnption. Single cell protein or algae grown from effluent 
appear encouraging alternatives. 
A further problem is that with some species, notably 
yellowtail and eel, it has not yet been possible to develop young 
fish from eggs. This implies extra costs in collection of natural 
baby fish. Finally a good deal more work needs to be done on 
site improvement for fish farming. 
The Japanese government has already recognised the 
significance of fish farming and in 1976 drew up a seven year plan 
to raise more fish in Japan1s coastal waters. The project 
involves about $0.8 billion and is expected to increase fish 
supplies by about 370,000 tons per year. 
(f) Considerable potential is available in Japan for saving of 
fish resources. For example it has been estimated that up to 
40 per cent of fish taken in Japan are discarded. These are 
low value low market appeal species. In addition between 
22 and 26 per cent of fish caught are used for animal or fish 
feed. This is principally sardine species. Consequently 
there is a great deal of interest in devising processing techniques 
by which these species may be used for human consumption, 
particularly processes by which they may be used for kamaboko 
production. 
The process of kamaboko production itself, using Alaska 
pollack, is also very was teful because only fibrous protein can 
be utilised with the soluble protein fraction being discharged as 
effluent at the same time creating pollution problems. This 
means that only about 50 per cent of protein from Alaska pollack 
is utilised. Japanese scientists are consequently working on 
techniques for utilisation of the soluble protein fraction currently 
being discarded. 
Of Japan1s total fish consumed, 9.3 per cent is available 
as protein. Above this a good deal of protein is lost in various 
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ways including the soluble protein loss in kamaboko manufacture. 
It has been suggested that this could be increased to 12.5 per cent 
through exercise of resource saving methods. The implication 
of this is that about 7 per cent less fish could be consumed and 
Japanese people would still retain their current protein nutritional 
status. 
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(g) A final strategy option open to Japan is to substitute more 
livestock product or plant protein consumption for fish consumption. 
The livestock product substitution could be achieved in two ways; 
by either greater imports of finished livestock; or by greater 
feedstuff imports. This option is obviously of critical interest 
to New Zealand for it is clearly in New Zealand I s interests for 
Japan to adopt the former alternative rather than the latter. 
Nor is protein consumption in Japan necessarily confined to 
animal sources. It has been estimated that already 30 per cent 
of hamburger and sausage protein is based on protein extracted 
from soya beans. Research is now being directed towards greater 
use of wheat protein for similar purposes. Although this process 
is more expensive than soya bean protein extraction it does provide 
higher quality protein and it is possible that it may be used in 
kamaboko production, again minimising losses in kamaboko 
production through the lessened availability of Alaska pollack. 
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7. CONSUMERS' PREFERENCES 
. One factor which may influence the implementation of 
new policies related to fish consumption is the attitude of the consumer 
towards different fish species and towards fish-relative to meat. 
While definitive indications of consumer reaction are not available, 
a good deal can be deduced3rom: various information available. 
Figure One for example shows that since 1975 the price of meat 
has fallen relative to fish and at the same time the consumption of 
meat relative to fish has increased considerably. As a consequence 
it can be anticipated that if fish prices increase as a result of lessened 
availability the trend for meat consumption to increase relative to 
fish will continue. 
Figure Two provides a little more detail with respect to 
fish and meat types butcin this case shows only relative movements in 
consumer prices. This Figure shows the fall in meat prices for 
chicken and a slight fall for pork over the period 1963-1977. Beef 
prices increased substantially but all categories of fish (high, medium 
\ 
and low priced species) increased, the rate of increase beiT).g higher 
for the higher priced species. This indicates a preference for the 
higher priced species with price pressures being exerted on these as 
incomes have grown over this period. 
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Further indications of the consumer rankings of different 
fish species are provided in the following table which shows income 
and price elasticities for a range of species on the Japanese market. 
TABLE SIX 
Income and Price Elas tici tie s for Various Fish Species 
on he Japanese Market 
Species Income Elasticity Price Elasticity 
Tuna 0,68 - 0.06 
Horse Mackerel 0.20 0.95 
Skipjack 2.57 - 2.00 
Salmon - 0.52 - 0.65 
Blue Mackerel - 0.67 - 2.16 
Sarna (Sauries) 2.06 - 1.90 
Snapper 0.44 - 1.39 
Sole 1. 32 - 1. 73 
Prawn Crabs 4.03 - 2.32 
Salted & Fried Fish 1.13 - O. 73 
Source Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Japan. 
Income elasticity figures with high values indicate that as 
incomes grow in Japan consumption of these species will increase 
subs tantiall y. Thus as incomes grow substantial growth in demand 
can be expected for prawn and crabs, skipjack, sarna, sole and 
salted and dried fish with lesser rates of increase for others. For 
salmon and blue mackerel the negative sign indicates that as 
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incomes increase consumption of these species will actually decrease. 
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Similarly high price elasticity figures indicate that for a 
given increase (decrease) in price, consumption of the species 
concer.q.ed will decrease (increase) substantially. Thus consumption 
of prawns and crabs, blue mackerel, skipjack, sama, sole and 
snapper is fairly responsive to price change s and other species not 
so responsive. For the higher priced species in particular, 
increases in prices with supply limitations, without the operation 
of any other factors such as income changes which influence demand, 
can be expected to exert a substantial depressing effect on quantities 
consumed and substitution of lower priced fish species or other forms 
of animal protein. 

8. IMPACT OF 200 MILE ECONOMIC ZONE ON 
FISHING INDUSTRY IN JAPAN 
Very little detailed quantitative information is available at 
this stage on the impact of world-wide 200 mile economic zones on 
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the Japanese fishing industry. Furthermore any assessment of such 
an impact and the power of fishing industry interests to exert pressures 
to overcome the negative effects of these impacts should be measured 
against the political power of agricultural interests in Japan. 
Earlier discussion has made it clear that small fishermen 
reliant on Alaska pollack catches and kamaboko processors are likely 
to be hardest hit by the new world fishing order. Furthermore this 
has regional connotations for Hokkaido in particular and for the port 
of Kushiro on that island. Hokkaido squid fishermen are also likely 
to be most affected by exclusion from Russian waters. 
The Japanese fishing industry is basically very small in scale, 
composing 233,200 different business entities. Of these 95 per cent 
are regarded as being small in scale. This means that for the 
industry overall each firm owns an average of only 1.3 vessels of 
about 100 tons. Looking at the structure another way the industry has 
only 19 companies which could be regarded as major companies having 
capital of greater than ¥ 100 million. 
Because of the relative smallness of the organisations in the 
industry, lack of access to foreign waters has considerable social 
significance to the small fishermen who earn their livelihood especially 
in Soviet waters. 
Of the 500,000 fishermen in Japan it is estimated that 40,000 
have been operating predominantly within 200 limits of other countries. 
While the fishing industry in general has been resisting strongly the 
loss of fishing grounds and has tried to enlist public support by mass 
rallies aimed at highlighting Japan's food problems, they have had 
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very little impact. Although their numbers are substantial their 
organisation in the past has been very fragmented. Furthermore, 
fishing has never been very significant in Japanese government 
policy making with the Fisheries Agency of Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry having only a minor position in the whole administration. 
The government reaction to pleas by fishing organisations to protect 
their interests has therefore be~n more in terms of offers of assistance 
to restructure the industry and to move out of the industry. 
Nor have the small number of large companies been able 
to exert much influence on their government because of their lack of 
number s. This inadequacy is highlighted particularly in the case of 
negotia tions with New Zealand. The Japanese trawling catch in -
New Zealand waters is taken predominantly by only three companies. 
Furthermore the losses to large companies such as these is not as 
great as may have been expected because they have diversified their 
activities considerably over recent years so that the proportion of 
their revenue coming directly from fishing activities has fallen from 
about 80 per cent to only about 30 per cent. In New Zealand I s case 
it is probable that the- squid interests which are much smaller in 
scale and have a great deal more to lose than the large trawling 
companies would have more influence on their government. 
However, no matter what influence they do have, this 
influence can in no way compare with that of the agricultural lobby 
in Japan. The power of the agricultural lobby is a reflection partly 
of the electoral system which has existed in Japan since 1949, which 
is highly biased towards rural electorates and partly a reflection of 
the way in which the various sectors within the rural economy have 
organised themselves politically. This organisation is concentrated 
on the massive Agricultural Co-operative Association (Nokyo) which 
is said to have power, if not to ensure the success of national Diet 
candidates, to ensure that certain candidates will lose. 
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Within the Diet, farm spokesmen are organised both into 
various general agriculture committees and constituency dictated 
interests such as rice dietmen, peanut dietmen, grapefruit dietman, 
and livestock dietmen. Livestock, especially beef interests, are 
further institutionalised by a number of other influential associations 
which maintain close relationships with Nokyo and the Diet. The 
inter-relationships of these various groups even concerns individuals 
who are represented on several organisations. The final and perhaps 
the ultimate in institutionalisation of livestock interests is the trading 
organisation, Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation, which has a 
prime role in beef imports and imports of a number of dairy products. 
Although its function is to "stabilise" prices it does so at substantially 
above CIF prices with profits on trading regarded by many as going to 
uses which would preserve the interests of livestock farmers in Japan. 
The effectiveness of the livestock industry organisation, 
especially with respect to beef, is legend and in view of this and 
genuine concern about questions of food self sufficiency, Japanese 
administrators, when asked to make choices between agricultural 
and fisheries interests, find that very great courage, or very great 
pressure indeed is needed to adopt any policies which run counter 
to the interests of agricultural producers. Even severe pressure 
recently applied by the United States in relation to Japan's trade 
surpluses has made only a small dent in the Japanese agricultural 
protection armour. 

9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
New Zealand, in its negotiations with Japan over fishing 
access had as its objective greater sales of agricultural products 
to Japan by freer movement of trade. Lack of access to New 
Zealand fishing grounds for Japan means the following things: 
(a) A very small loss of fin fish supplies. This los s is 
within the range of annual fluctuations in total fish supplies 
and is sustained largely by only three companies who already 
have joint venture operations of various descriptions in 
New Zealand waters. 
(b) More severe losses of squid supplies and certain 
difficulties for the Japanese squid fishing industry and its 
ancillary processing industries, especially in the off season, 
remembering that not only are normally defined fixed costs 
high but that because of the Japanese employment system most 
labour needs to be retained in the off season. 
(c) Some difficulties for the Japanese tuna fishing industry. 
(d) Loss of access to potential deep sea fish resources. 
This is possibly the most significant loss for Japan as a nation, 
for access to currently unexploited resources in the world is 
likely to be an important plank in Japanese strategies to counter 
world-wide 200 mile economic zone declarations. 
(e) A loss of prestige and possible political loss by the 
Japanese Government which may lead to charges of mishandling 
the highly publicised negotiations with New Zealand. 
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These potential costs should be viewed against a background 
where the political pressures exerted by the agricultural sector far 
outweigh those of the fishing sector. In addition not only has Japan 
a wide range of policy options by which she can counteract effects 
of exclusion from the world's 2 00 mile economic zones, but at this 
stage she does not know the extent to which it will be necessary to 
adopt these policies. Even if she is excluded from these waters 
completely it will be some time before this occurs and there is no 
necessity to take early action. Furthermore this discussion has 
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shown that were Japan to exercise even those contra options available 
to it which require no co-operation of other countries, given that a 
number of technical problems can be overcome, she could almost 
completely compensate for potential supply losses. Finally, if 
Japan were to accede to demands made on it by New Zealand, which 
have no precedent in the short history of negotiation of access to 
the world's 200 mile economic zones, she may consider that she 
was laying herself open to similar demands from other small 
countries and that this may be a dangerous precedent. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the possibility for 
New Zealand successfully achieving its objectives in negotiating with 
Japan in the way that it has, are limited. On the other hand even 
if this is true it can be asked both if New Zealand has gained in other 
ways and/or if New Zealand has lost anything through the negotiations. 
The answer to the first question is a definite yes. New Zealand has 
clearly won a great deal of an extremely valuable element in marketing 
success in Japan, public awareness of New Zealand and its products. 
The impact of this cannot be over-estimated although it will need to 
be followed up in order to capitalise on it. The loss potential of 
New Zealand's form of negotiation is minimal. New Zealand has 
many options for the development of its fishing industry and the disposal 
of its fish catch. Nor is it likely that there will be an administrative 
reac tion against other commodities New Zealand currently exports 
to Japan. 
A more diffic.ult question is whether or not New Zealand 
could have achieved its objectives better in other ways.. Joint 
approa~hes with Australia, South Pacific countries, and tangible 
support by the United States, may have been more persuasive, 
but with the objectives of these countries somewhat at variance 
and lack of real will to act In concert would have made this difficult 
to organise. A more precise definition of objectives may have 
lead to different negotiating approaches. New Zealand's real 
objecti ve is to sell more finished livestock products to Japan. 
This could be achieved in part by reduction of or reduced growth 
of Japan's feedstuffs imports for its domestic livestock industry. 
Greater domestic production of feedstuffs to support a static 
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livestock industry is an agricultural policy option which has considerable 
appeal in Japan currently and the first stages of a move towards such 
a policy are currently being enacted. A negotiating approach by 
New Zealand which encouraged such a policy and ensured for 
New Zealand a resultant trade spin-off in livestock products may 
have been, and still is, an option worthy of detailed study by 
New Zealand. 
The most contentious and difficult question which has faced 
New Zealand negotiators has been whether or not New Zealand should 
have adopted an approach to bargaining used domestically in Japan 
where confrontation is avoided or whether the forceful demanding 
approach has been more appropriate. Evidence has shown that 
demands have been successful when used by countries with substantial 
bargaining power. New Zealand's bargaining power does not appear 
as substantial as the successful cases cited. Furthermore, more 
moderate, if not really Japanese, approaches by New Zealand have 
not been successful in the past. Against this a true Japanese approach 
saying, "I am in trouble, please help me!, II may not be appropriate 
between governments even though it has been known to work satisfactorally 
internationally where Japanese companies have been involved. 
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APPENDIX I 
AGRICULTURAL AND MARINE PRODUCTS REMAINING 
UNDER RESIDUAL IMPORT RESTRICTIONS (1974) 
Clas s ification 
Livestock 
Marine Products 
Fruit and Vegetables 
Sugar and Starches 
Grain 
Other Agricultural and 
+ Related Foods 
BTN No. 
02.01 
04.01 
04.02 
04.04 
16.02 
03.01 
03.02 
03.03 
12.08 
08.02 
08.11 
20.05 
20.06 
20.07 
21.04 
11. 08 
17.02 
11.01 
11.02 
07.05 
12.01 
12.08 
21. 07 
Description of Goods 
Beef 
Milk and Crearrl (Fresh) 
Milk and Crearrl (Processed) 
Processed Cheese 
Preserved Meat Offal of Bovine 
or Pigs 
Inshore Fish and Cos Roe(Fresh) 
Inshore Fish and Cod Roe(Balted etc. ). 
Scallops, Shellfish and Cuttlefish 
(F resh, Salted) 
Edible Seaweed 
Oranges and Tangerines (Fresh) 
Oranges and Tangerines 
Terrlporarily Preserved 
Fruit Puree and Fruit Pastes 
Canned Pineapples, Fruit Pulp 
Fruit Juices, TOrrlato Juice 
TOrrlato Ketchup, Totpato Sauce, 
and Mixed Seasonings 
. Starches and Inulin 
Grape Sugar etc. 
Wheat and Rice Flour, etc. 
Whea t and Rice Groat 
Srrlall Red Beans, Broad Beans 
and Peas 
Ground Nuts 
(except for Vegetable Oil) 
Tubers of Konnyaku(AInorphophallus) 
Food Preparations of Sugar, Milk, 
Seaweed, Wheat, etc. 
Note: Malt irrlports were liberalised in October 1974 
Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry. 
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APPENDIX II 
FISH IMPORT QUOTAS BY SPECIES 
Herring genus Clupea General Tariff 1976 13000 tonnes 
10 per cent (for processing) 
Sardine Sardinops Korea (including squid) 
Anchovy Engraulis 1975 US$1 7.6 million 
Rou.~ld Herring Ecrumeus 1976 (Apr-Sept) 
USS$1 O. 5 million 
Jack Mackerel Trachurus General Tariff (Oct-Mar) 
Scad(Muro) Decapterus 10 per cent US$12.6 million 
(est. ). 
Mackerel Scomber 
66 countries 
Saury Cololabis 1975 US$1 0.0 million 
1976 (Apr-Sept) 
Yellowtail Seriola US$5.0 million 
(Oct-Mar) 
Cod Gadus (US$5.0 million 
Alaska Pollack Theragra (est. ). 
Hard roe of Cod General Tariff 1975 3, 750 tonnes 
10 per cent 1976 (Apr-Sept) 
1,875 tonnes 
(Oct-Mar) not 
yet fixed 
Cuttlefish Sepiella General Tariff 1975 40,000 tonnes 
(Mongo) 10 per cent 1976 (Apr- Sept) 
20,000 tonnes 
(Oct-Mar) not 
yet fixed 
Squid Sepiella General Tariff 66 countries 
Loligo 10 per cent 1975 15,900 tonnes 
Ommastrephes 1976 (Apr-Sept) 
8,200 tonnes· 
(Oct-Mar) not 
yet fixed 
Scallop Pecton General Tariff 
10 per cent 
Laver(Korea) Porphyra 1. 5 yen/ sheet 
Kelp Laminaria 15 per cent 1975 1660 tonnes 
1976 1660 tonnes 
Dried seaweed 15 per cent 1975 60 tonnes 
1976 60 tonnes 
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